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ABSTRACT
The IEEE802.15.4e-2012 standard is widely used in multi-hop wireless Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)
applications. In the Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH) mode, nodes are synchronized, and time is
cut into timeslots. A schedule orchestrates all communications, resulting in high reliability and low power
operations. A timeslot must be long enough for a node to send a data frame to its neighbor, and for that
neighbor to send back an acknowledgment. Shorter timeslots enable higher bandwidth and lower latency, yet
the minimal timeslot duration is limited by how long link-layer security operations take. We evaluate the
overhead of link-layer security in TSCH networks in terms of minimal timeslot length, memory footprint,
and energy consumption. We implement full link-layer security on a range of hardware platforms, exploring
different hardware/software implementation strategies. Through an extensive measurement campaign, we
quantify the advantage of hardware accelerations for link-layer security, and show how the minimal duration
of a timeslot varies between 9 ms and 88 ms for the most common configuration, depending on hardware
support. Furthermore, we also highlighted the impact that the timeslot duration has on both high-level
application design and energy consumption. Copyright c© 0000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is generally envisioned
as a networked system of smart interacting objects
(i.e., sensors, machines, vehicles, smart phones,
tablets, etc.) [1]. According to recent forecasts
of leading companies of the sector [2]-[4], around
50 billions devices are expected by 2020 to be
part of the IoT. Furthermore, the introduction
of the IoT into the manufacturing environment
is leading to the emerging Industrial Internet of
Things (IIoT), leveraging a class of low-power
wireless networks used in critical applications such
as industrial process monitoring and automation.
These networks are receiving significant attention
from standardization bodies, and a new wave of IIoT
products is hitting the market [5].
A cornerstone technology for the IIoT is the
Time-Slotted Channel Hopping (TSCH). TSCH
networks were introduced in 2006 in the Time
Synchronized Mesh Protocol (TSMP) [6]. The core
of this proprietary solution was standardized in
WirelessHART [7] in 2007 and in the IEEE802.15.4e
TSCH amendment [8] in 2012. TSCH is becoming
a key enabling technology for the IIoT. Tens of
thousands of TSCH networks are operating today [9].
Furthermore, it is receiving lots of attention from the
standardization community, for example through the
IETF 6TiSCH working group [10], and widespread
adoption in happening [4].
In TSCH networks, all nodes are synchronized,
and the time is cut into timeslots. During a timeslot,
a node sends a frame to its neighbor, and that
neighbor sends back a link-layer acknowledgment
indicating the successful reception. Specifically, the
whole communication is orchestrated by a schedule
which indicates, to each node, what to do in each
slot: transmit, listen or sleep. In general, it is
preferable to have a time slot as small as possible:
the shorter the timeslot, the lower the latency and
the higher the throughput of a network. However, its
value must be minimized by taking into account the
computational capabilities actually offered by a real
platform, which define the amount of time required
to correctly execute all the operations triggered by
the aforementioned communication schedule (more
details are provided in Section 3).
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In the IIoT context, security is paramount. As
with all networking solutions, security happens at
all layers of the protocol stack. At the link layer, all
frames are secured: they can be authenticated and/or
encrypted, using the mechanisms standardized in
[8]. Securing and unsecuring a frame, as detailed
in Section 3, are complex and potentially time-
consuming operations. Moreover, different platforms
have different hardware capabilities: on some, link-
layer security can be accomplished using hardware
support; on others, these operations need to be
done in software because of the lack of hardware
accelerators. Anyway, when security procedures are
integrated in the TSCH communication schedule, a
further computational overhead is introduced and
the (minimum) timeslot duration is expected to
increase as well, due to the additional time needed
to secure/unsecure frames.
Starting from these premises, the present
contribution wants to answer the following question:
How much shorter can a timeslot be?
At the time of this writing, several contributions
already investigated the effects of security operations
in IoT systems on system capabilities [11]-[15].
Nevertheless, for the best of authors knowledge,
they only focus on the legacy IEEE802.15.4-2011
[16] and no studies on IIoT networks based on
TSCH are yet available (TSCH was not present
in the legacy IEEE802.15.4-2011 standard, while it
was introduced in the IEEE802.15.4e amendment,
in 2012, and maintained in the latest version of the
standard, that is IEEE802.15.4-2015 [17]).
To bridge this gap, this work aims at experimen-
tally measuring the overhead of link-layer security
in TSCH networks, on the minimal duration of
a timeslot and on the memory footprint of the
implementation. It is important to remark that we do
not propose a new link-layer security mechanism. On
the contrary, we would deeply investigate the impact
that the one already proposed by the IEEE802.15.4e
amendment, and maintained in IEEE802.15.4-2015,
has in real IIoT systems. The scientific contribution
of this articles is four-folded:
- We discuss the security functionalities in
TSCH networks, the communication schedule
described in the IEEE802.15.4e amendment
(and maintained in IEEE802.15.4-2015), and
the hardware support for link-layer security
operations in today’s IIoT platforms.
- We implement full link-layer security on older
and state-of-the-art platforms, using different
hardware/software strategies. The produced
open-source code is released under the BSD
license∗.
∗ http://telematics.poliba.it/openwsn_ieee802154_security
- We conduct an exhaustive experimental study
and measure that the minimal value of
the timeslot duration is between 9 ms and
88 ms (for the most common security level,
described in Section 3.2), across the different
platforms and strategies.
- We describe the impact that the minimum
timeslot has on both high-level application
design and energy consumption.
The remainder of this article is organized
as follows. Section 2 lists the most closely
related works. Section 3 introduces the link-layer
security mechanisms available in IEEE802.15.4.
Section 4 discusses our different hardware and
software link-layer security implementations, on
both older and state-of-the-art platforms. Section 5
presents the experimental results, alongside further
considerations on high-level applications design and
energy consumption. Finally, Section 6 concludes
this article.
2. RELATED WORKS
Although this article is not the first to evaluate
the overhead of security in IEEE802.15.4 networks,
it is, to the best of our knowledge, the first work
that focuses on security in the IEEE802.15.4e TSCH
amendment. This section lists the most closely
related works.
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)-CBC-
MAC Mode (CCM) scheme can be used at different
layers of the protocol stack. For instance, in [18] it is
used for application-layer security. [19], [20] and [21]
further discuss its suitability for the TLS/DTLS
protocols at the transport layer. In [22] and [23] it
is used at the network layer of an IoT-compliant
protocol stack. Finally, in [24, 25] it is used at the
link layer.
In these last works, the authors show, by exper-
imentation, that the hardware support provided by
different platforms can be used to significantly speed
up the execution of cryptographic primitives.
[13] studies the performance of the AES-CCM at
the link layer, and compares it to other well-known
cryptography schemes. The authors show that, even
though AES is not the most efficient block cipher
in terms of code-size and time performance, its well-
known security properties, as well as the possibility
to perform it in hardware, makes it the most suitable
solution. The work presented in [26] evaluates
the impact that cryptographic algorithms have on
IoT resources (i.e. memory, processing, energy). It
demonstrates that the Rijndael algorithm, which is
the AES scheme, is one of efficient ciphers for IoT
devices (as other block ciphers), offering a good
compromise between code-size and cycle-count.
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Several works discuss the advantages of hardware
acceleration for security operations. The first contri-
bution that highlighted the performance gain offered
by hardware accelerators in CC2420-based platform
(i.e. Crossbow MICAz and MoteIVs TmoteSKY)
was [27]. In [28], the authors describe a compact
and energy-efficient hardware implementation of
IEEE802.15.4 security, and show its advantage in
terms of execution speed and energy consumption.
In [29], the authors design an energy-efficient hard-
ware architecture for AES-CCM for IEEE802.15.4
networks. This work is completely integrable in the
current article, as it provides an efficient way to per-
form AES-CCM. [30] evaluates hardware, software,
and hybrid implementations of the AES encryption
engine on IoT micro-controllers, along with a discus-
sion about the tradeoffs between energy, throughput
of the hardware module, memory footprint, and
battery lifetime. Nevertheless, authors do not discuss
the integration of AES cryptography algorithm with
IEEE 802.15.4(e) security processing, as well as the
impact derived by the adoption of such solutions on
the overall network operation. All of these works are
perfectly integrable with the current article, and can
be effectively used to further improve global network
performances.
Similar to the current article, [11, 12, 13, 14,
15] analyze the impact of IEEE802.15.4 security
processing on network performance. [11] analyzes
the impact of the inclusion of link-layer encryption
and authentication services on energy and memory
consumption, on Tmote-Sky motes. However, only
the hardware implementation is presented, timing
issues are not considered, nor is the integration
with TSCH. [12] analyzes the impact of link-
layer security processing on IEEE802.15.4 network
performance (at the application layer) and on
other protocol parameters. The authors focus on
time and energy consumption. By simulations, they
show that encryption and authentication affect
the end-to-end application delay, but they do not
include a discussion about the impact of link-
layer security on the performance of the MAC
protocol. [13] presents an implementation and
performance evaluation of security functionalities
at the link layer of IEEE802.15.4-compliant IoT
devices. The authors present software and hardware
implementations of security functionalities over the
AVR XMEGA platform, evaluating memory and
energy consumption produced by each one. Authors
in [31] propose a novel mathematical tool for
analyzing the IEEE 802.15.4 network performance,
considering a fixed slot duration. The included model
is perfectly integrable in our work, and can be
used to derive different MAC delays when security
is enabled. Authors in [14] evaluate the energetic
cost of IEEE802.15.4 security in the context of
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Figure 1. CCM* allows every frame to be encrypted and/or
authenticated.
energy harvesting devices and beacon-enabled mode.
However, the impact of security processing over
the TSCH mode of IEEE802.15.4e-2012 is not
considered. An analytical evaluation of security
overhead in the IEEE802.15.4 networks only is also
presented in [15].
Several works focus on the new IEEE802.15.4e-
2012 TSCH standard [9, 32, 33]. Yet, to the best of
our knowledge, no work focuses on the performance
of link-layer security.
3. LINK-LAYER SECURITY
MECHANISMS IN IEEE802.15.4
Link-layer security has been part of IEEE802.15.4
since its first revision in 2003. This section provides
the necessary background by describing the under-
lying mechanisms AES and CCM* (Section 3.1),
and how these are used in IEEE802.15.4-2011 (Sec-
tion 3.2), IEEE802.15.4e-2012 (Section 3.3), and
IEEE802.15.4-2015 (Section 3.4).
3.1. AES-128 and CCM*
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block
cipher which encrypts a sequence of plaintext bytes
in blocks of 16 bytes, using a 128-bit key in its
AES-128 variant. It uses a series of permutations
and substitutions, and therefore executes fast when
implemented in both hardware and software.
CCM* is a “wrapper” cryptographic primitive
around AES-128 that uses CTR mode for encryption
and CBC-MAC for authentication. It encrypts
and/or authenticates an arbitrarily long sequence of
plaintext bytes (note that a theoretic upper bound
on the message length for CCM scheme exists, but
for practical purposes it can be considered arbitrarily
long for IIoT technology) . When applied to a link-
layer frame, this means that CCM* can encrypt
the Medium Access Control (MAC) payload while
keeping the MAC header intact. When used to
authenticate a frame, CCM* calculates a Message
Integrity Code (MIC) over the complete frame. This
MIC is truncated to the desired length (4, 8 or 16
bytes), and appended at the end of the frame.
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Each frame secured with a given key must use
a different nonce. Encrypting two frames with the
same nonce has severe consequences on security:
plaintext of both frames may be easily recovered. By
constructing the nonce with a monotonic counter,
it is possible to ensure replay protection for two
communicating nodes. We depict this in Fig. 1.
3.2. Link-layer Security in IEEE802.15.4-2011
Table I depicts the security levels of IEEE802.15.4.
Levels differ in MIC length and whether encryption
is applied on the payload or not. A higher security
level induces a larger frame due to the longer MIC,
but computational overhead stays the same. Each
MAC frame can use a different security level. Local
policies dictate if the security level of the received
frame should be accepted or not. These conformance
checks are a pre-requisite for the CCM* verification
to be invoked.
Each secured frame carries an Auxiliary Security
Header (ASH) with signaling information related
to the key and nonce. In IEEE802.15.4-2011, the
nonce is created from the address of the sender and
the local frame counter that increments for each
transmitted frame. The 4-byte frame counter must
be signaled to the recipient, and is therefore included
in the ASH. Because the recipient keeps track of the
last frame counter it received from a given neighbor,
frames are protected against replay attacks. Key
signaling overhead varies with the key management
scheme used, and can range from 0 bytes for implicit
keying to 9 bytes. The total ASH overhead (not
including the MIC) ranges from 5 to 14 bytes.
The upper layer sets the specific security level and
the key to be used on beacon, command or data
frames. However, Acknowledgment (ACK) frames in
IEEE802.15.4-2011 do not support security and are
always sent in clear.
3.3. Changes introduced with link-layer security in
IEEE802.15.4e-2012
IEEE802.15.4e introduces Information Elements
(IE) to exchange information between neighbor
nodes in a TSCH network. Nodes maintain
synchronization by indicating the time correction as
part of an IE in ACK frames. An attacker could
perform Denial of Service (DoS) attacks by altering
this time correction; for this reason IEEE802.15.4e-
2012 added support for secured ACK frames.
Fig. 2 depicts the operations that happen in a
timeslot when A sends a data frame to B:
- A secures the data frame. We call this
operation sec1.
- At precisely TsTxOffset into the timeslot,
A sends this (secured) frame to B. The
A DATA
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?
sec4
ACK
sec2 sec3
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TsTxOffset
TsSlotDuration
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Figure 2. The minimal duration of a timeslot in an IEEE802.15.4e
TSCH network depends on how long link-layer security operations
take.
transmission of the data frame takes at most
TsMaxTx.
- B unsecures the data frame, which can
involve decrypting and/or authenticating it
(operation sec2).
- If the unsecuring operation is successful, B
secures an ACK frame (operation sec3).
- Exactly TsTxAckDelay after receiving the end
of the data frame, B sends the (secured) ACK
frame. The transmission of the ACK frame
takes at most TsMaxAck.
- A unsecures the ACK frame (operation sec4).
If successful, it removes the data frame from
its transmission queue.
Eq. (1) indicates the timing constraints that the
duration of those security operations put on the
different TSCH timings. We denote dur(sec1) the
duration of sec1.
TsTxOffset ≥ dur(sec1)
TsTxAckDelay ≥ dur(sec2) + dur(sec3)
TsSlotDuration ≥ TsTxOffset + TsMaxTx+
TsTxAckDelay + TsMaxAck+
dur(sec4)
(1)
Time synchronization in the network means that
all nodes share the Absolute Slot Number (ASN): the
number of slots which have passed since the network
has started. The ASN is forever incrementing†. A
common notion of time simplifies replay protection
as a node does not need to maintain a frame counter
for each of its neighbors. Instead, TSCH uses the
ASN as a frame counter and omits its inclusion in
the ASH, reducing the overhead by 4 bytes.
The use of ASN in the nonce implies that the
sec1 operation can only be done once the ASN of
the slot is known (see Fig. 2). In practice, this
means that pre-calculating the sec1 operation is not
possible. Operation sec1 includes the key lookup and
†The ASN is encoded on 5 bytes. With a 10 ms timeslot duration,
the ASN value rolls over every 350 years.
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Table I. The security levels in IEEE802.15.4.
mode encrypted payload? MIC length
MIC-32 NO 4 bytes
MIC-64 NO 8 bytes
MIC-128 NO 16 bytes
ENC YES no MIC
ENC-MIC-32 YES 4 bytes
ENC-MIC-64 YES 8 bytes
ENC-MIC-128 YES 16 bytes
CCM* encryption on a potentially maximum length
frame (127 bytes). Before the receiving node can
transmit an ACK, it must verify the conformance
of the frame against local security policies and
decrypt/authenticate it (sec2). Finally, the node
prepares and secures the ACK frame (sec3), which
includes the time correction indication. Before the
time correction can be applied on the transmission
side (node A in Fig. 2), the ACK frame must
pass the CCM* check and conformance verifications
(sec4). The duration of the sec1, sec2, sec3 and sec4
operations on different hardware platforms directly
influences the minimum slot duration, which we
evaluate experimentally in Section 5.
3.4. Further amendments introduced with
IEEE802.15.4-2015
The security sub-layer standardized in
IEEE802.15.4-2015 [17] generally integrates
security services defined in both IEEE802.15.4-
2011 and IEEE802.15.4e-2012. However, some few
amendments have been introduced.
First of all, the ENC security level is not
supported anymore because it is not robust against
trivial Man-In-The-Middle attacks. Secured and
unsecured communications can coexist in the same
network (for instance, in the case a device has
not enough resources to manage security, it can
use a Capability IE to inform its neighbors about
this issue, thus asking them to switch to unsecured
communications). Moreover, IEs and specific frames
introduced by previous specifications (such as
command frames defined in IEEE802.15.4e-2012)
can be protected.
A different management of the frame counter
is defined for the two possible network operation
modes. In the legacy mode, it is an integer value
associated to the device and to the key used to
protect the communication. In the TSCH mode,
instead, the frame counter is elided from the packet.
Few updates of both ongoing and incoming
security functionalities have been added in order
to take care of aforementioned amendments.
Nevertheless, these changes do not modify the
computational overhead introduced by security
functionalities defined in IEEE802.15.4e-2012, which
is instead mainly due to AES and CCM* operations.
4. LINK-LAYER SECURITY
IMPLEMENTATIONS
This section describes the strategies we pur-
sued to implement link-layer security and CCM*
in IEEE802.15.4e-2012 (and IEEE802.15.4-2015)
TSCH networks. In Section 4.1, we introduce the
hardware platforms used for our evaluations that
are also supported in the OpenWSN stack. Three
different implementations strategies are presented:
software (Section 4.2), hardware (Section 4.3) and
hybrid (Section 4.4). They differ in whether hard-
ware support for AES and/or CCM* is available and
exploited (see Table II).
All source code developed is available open-
source, under a BSD license.
4.1. Platforms Used
Our goal is to quantify the overhead of link-
layer security on a range of hardware platforms,
and using different software strategies. Therefore,
we choose to implement full link-layer security
on platforms separated by a decade of hardware
development: TelosB (in many ways obsolete but still
very popular) and the OpenMote-CC2538 (a state-
of-the-art platform).
TelosB. The TelosB mote [34] (designed in
2004) features an MSP430 microcontroller (16-bit
architecture, 8 MHz maximum CPU speed, 48 kB
flash, 10 kB RAM), and a CC2420 radio chip.
The CC2420 radio [35] chip provides hardware
acceleration for both AES and CCM*.
To execute an AES operation in hardware on the
CC2420, one loads 16 bytes of cleartext into a buffer
and a 16-byte key in a dedicated register, and issues a
SAES command. This “atomic” AES operation takes
14µs, a number which does not account for the time
to load the buffer and key from the micro-controller
into the radio chip. Also, one has to execute this
operation for each 16-byte block of a long frame.
5
To execute a CCM* operation in hardware on
the CC2420, one sets the Security Control 0
and Security Control 1 registers to configure the
security mode, the length of the authentication
tag, the length of data to be authenticated but
not encrypted, and the exact position where
authenticated data starts. The nonce has to be
loaded in the TXNONCE register and the frame into
the transmission queue. Issuing a STXENC executes
a CCM operation in the buffer; issuing STXON
additionally transmits the frame. Considering a
message of 119 bytes, a CCM operation takes 222µs.
The TelosB is a two chip-solution: the micro-
controller and radio chips are connected by an SPI
digital interface. Given the speed of this bus, it takes
approximately 1 ms to transfer a full-sized frame
between the chips. This adds a extra delay to the
minimal timeslot duration.
OpenMote-CC2538. The OpenMote-CC2538
mote [36] (designed in 2014) is a state-of-the-art
platform at the time to writing, which features
a single-chip CC2538 solution. This chip contains
both an ARM Cortex-M3 micro-controller (32-bit
architecture, 32 MHz maximum CPU speed, 512 kB
flash, 32 kB RAM) and a IEEE802.15.4-compliant
radio. One immediate advantage of such a single-
chip solution is that the micro-controller and radio
chip share the same RAM memory; no time needs
to be spent transferring a packet to/from the radio
chip.
The CC2538 uses a single AES Control register
to configure/trigger AES and CCM* operations in
hardware. The AES module cuts the input bytes
into 16-byte blocks and triggers the AES operation
autonomously. When the operation finishes, the
master controller generates a data done interrupt
so the software can retrieve the encrypted data.
The software sets the nonce, key and other CCM*
configurations in the AES Control register.
A Direct Memory Access (DMA) modules takes
care of feeding the AES and CCM* modules, without
intervention from the software. This significantly
speeds up the operation when compared to the
CC2420. Encrypted/authenticated data is available
directly in RAM memory, no (time consuming) SPI
transfers are needed. Finally, the external 32 MHz
crystal oscillator is used to clock the AES and CCM*
hardware modules. This is possible because the AES
cryptoprocessor can be clocked independently from
the processor.
The AES algorithm executes at 18 Mbps‡. CCM
executes at 12 Mbps, including the final operation of
create the MIC. Thus, considering a single block of
128 bits, security operations are executed in 7µs for
‡http://www.ti.com.cn/cn/lit/ug/swru319c/swru319c.pdf
Table II. Implementation Strategies.
strategy AES CCM*
“software” (Sec. 4.2) software software
“hybrid” (Sec. 4.4) hardware software
“hardware” (Sec. 4.3) hardware hardware
the AES algorithm and 85µs for the CCM scheme.
The CC2538 completes AES and CCM tasks faster
than the CC2420.
OpenWSN. We use the OpenWSN implemen-
tation on both platforms. OpenWSN is an open-
source implementation of a standards-based proto-
col stack for the IoT. Its protocol stack includes
IEEE802.15.4e-2012 TSCH, 6LoWPAN, RPL and
CoAP [37].
We augment OpenWSN with link-layer security,
implemented using three strategies: in software
(Section 4.2), in hardware (Section 4.3), and a hybrid
solution (Section 4.4). As shown in Table II, these
strategies differ in whether they exploit hardware
acceleration for AES and/or CCM*. The three
strategies are detailed in the next sections.
4.2. Software Implementation
The “software” implementation strategy consists in
implementing both AES and CCM* in software.
We use a software AES implementation from Texas
Instruments§, unmodified. This implementation is
optimized for embedded devices, and features an
execution time approximately 10 times shorter than
a baseline AES implementation such as the one
presented in [38]. We implement CCM* from scratch.
As indicated above, all software is available open-
source.
In the software implementation, we purposely do
not use the hardware acceleration for AES/CCM*
offered by both platforms in order to be able to (1)
quantify how much shorter the timeslot can be when
using hardware acceleration, and (2) have an idea of
the performance of a platform which does not have
hardware acceleration.
4.3. Hardware Implementation
The “hardware” implementation strategy consists
in exploiting hardware acceleration for both AES
and CCM*. Both platforms offer AES and CCM*
hardware support, and we use the techniques
described in Section 4.1 in the implementation.
Even though the hardware executes the core
of the security operation, software instructions are
necessary to store security-related parameters in the
§ http://www.ti.com/tool/AES-128
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correct location, disable or enable hardware inter-
rupts, give the “go” signal for encryption/decryption
operations, and fetch the output of the operation.
4.4. Hybrid Implementation
Many hardware platforms offer AES hardware
acceleration, but not CCM*. To measure the
overhead of link-layer security on those platforms, we
adopt a “hybrid” implementation strategy in which
we rely on the hardware for AES, but implement
CCM* is software.
The hybrid implementation hence uses hardware-
accelerated AES block cipher. The rest of the
CCM* algorithm, which includes CTR and CBC-
MAC modes of operation, creation of plaintext and
ciphertext is handled through software instructions.
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section presents the experimental results
obtained on the implementations presented in
Section 4. Section 5.1 details the experimental
setup we use and the methodology we adopt
to tune the different durations in the timeslot.
Section 5.2 indicates the memory footprint of the
implementations, for both flash and RAM memory.
Section 5.3 presents the different durations measured
on both platforms, across the three implementation
strategies, and for all eight security levels. We
also discuss the implication for IEEE802.15.4e
TSCH networks. Section 5.4 discusses the energy
consumption related to the three implementation
strategies, and for all eight security levels. Finally,
Section 5.5 provides further comments on the impact
of timeslot duration on high-level application design.
5.1. Goals and Methodology
The goal of this experimental evaluation is to
implement the three implementation strategies on
both platforms, tune the timeslot duration to the
minimal value obtainable given the duration of
the link-layer security operations, and measure the
different timings. Specifically, we want to answer
the following question: How much shorter can a
timeslot be if hardware acceleration is used? We
also measure and report the memory footprint (the
amount of RAM and flash memory required) and the
energy consumption of the different implementation
strategies.
The experimental setup consists of two nodes
forming one network. One of the nodes is the root of
the network, the other is a leaf node that attaches to
the root. In each case, after loading the appropriate
software on the nodes, we boot the root node and
wait for the leaf node to synchronize to it. The root
node is attached to a computer; from that computer
we use the ping program to verify connectivity to
the leaf node. ping allows us to choose the size of the
payload sent in the ICMPv6 echo request/response
packets; we choose it so that the resulting link-layer
frame is always 127 bytes long (the maximum length
for IEEE802.15.4-compliant nodes).
In OpenWSN, IEEE802.15.4e TSCH is imple-
mented as a finite state machine. Different timings,
illustrated in Fig. 2, cause the state machine to
advance. TsTxOffset is an example timing: when
it expires, the state machine kicks off the trans-
mission of the frame. This means, at that point in
the timeslot, all the operations for preparing the
packet (including sec1) need to be complete. The
OpenWSN implementation uses a 32-kHz counter
to measure the duration of different phases of the
IEEE 802.15.4e finite state machine. This allows
us to measure the duration of the sec1, sec2, sec3
and sec4 operations, and verify the TsTxOffset,
TsTxAckDelay and TsSlotDuration durations.
For each evaluated case, we “tune” the dif-
ferent durations in order to obtain the shortest
possible timeslot. We start by setting TsTxOffset,
TsTxAckDelay and TsSlotDuration to very high val-
ues, then reduce them. In all cases, these values must
satisfy the constraints in Eq. (1). The different steps
of the tuning procedure are illustrated in Table III.
We first measure the duration of sec1, and reduce
the value of TsTxOffset accordingly. According to
the standard [8], TsMaxTx and TsMaxAck are set to
4.256 and 2.400 ms respectively. We then measure
the durations of sec2 and sec3, and set the value of
TsTxAckDelay accordingly. Similarly, we measure the
duration of sec4 and tune TsSlotDuration.
We repeat this tuning operation for both plat-
forms, using the three implementation approaches,
and for each of the 8 security levels. There are hence
48 cases, discussed in the following sections.
Note that sec1, sec2, sec3, and sec4 have been
measured by using the 32KHz counter available in
the OpenWSN protocol stack. Now, considering that
the variability of the amount of time needed to
execute security operations is very lower than the
resolution of this counter, obtained results (reported
in the following subsections) appear as deterministic.
Finally, results related to the energy consumption
are generated by considering the amount of
energy consumed by TelosB and OpenMote-CC2538
platforms when they perform different operations
in a timeslot (reference values are taken from their
datasheets).
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Table III. The different steps in the tuning procedure.
dur(sec1) measure
TsTxOffset tune to dur(sec1)
TsMaxTx set to 4.256 ms
dur(sec2) measure
dur(sec3) measure
TsTxAckDelay tune to dur(sec2)+dur(sec3)
TsMaxAck set to 2.400 ms
dur(sec4) measure
TsSlotDuration tune to TsTxOffset + TsMaxTx + TsTxAckDelay +
TsMaxAck + dur(sec4)
5.2. Memory Footprint
The memory footprint is the amount of flash ¶
and RAM memory that needs to be reserved for
link-layer security. Fig. 3 and 4 summarize the
results. The security level does not impact the
memory footprint, and is hence not presented.
Since the TelosB and OpenMote-CC2538 have both
different processor architectures and compilers, and
since different toolchains are used to build their
software, comparing the absolute value of the
memory footprint is not appropriate. Focusing on a
single platform, instead, the analysis of both ROM
and RAM footprints is useful to compare different
link-layer security implementations.
On the TelosB mote, link-layer security occupies
between 7% and 15% of the available flash memory,
and 30-40% of RAM memory. On the OpenMote-
CC2538, it occupies 1.5-2.5% of flash and 8% of
RAM. As can be expected, the footprint of the
software (resp. hardware) implementation is the
largest (resp. lowest).
In general, it is possible to observe that using
hardware acceleration for link-layer security does not
result in a drastically lower memory footprint. This
is because (i) a software implementation of AES
and CCM is relatively simple and (ii) even when
hardware acceleration is used, software is still needed
to drive the hardware.
On the TelosB mote, the number of instructions
needed to control AES and CCM algorithms in
hardware is the same. Therefore, the hardware
implementation registers a reduction of the ROM
footprint with respect to the hybrid implementation
because part of the software related to CCM
operations (e.g., instructions for CCM* vectors
handling) is deleted.
On the OpenMote-CC2538, instead, the driver
needed to control CCM operations in hardware has
a ROM footprint that is quite similar to the amount
of software used in the hybrid implementation.
¶We use flash and ROM (Read-Only Memory) interchangeably.
Therefore, this platform seems to report the same
ROM footprint when both hybrid and hardware
implementations are used.
5.3. Minimal Slot Length
Figs. 5 and 6 present the resulting TsTxOffset,
TsTxAckDelay and TsSlotDuration durations after
tuning procedure, for the TelosB and OpenMote-
CC2538 platforms, respectively.
When the “software” implementation is used,
TelosB and OpenMote-CC2538 executes security
operations at different speeds of the CPU. For
instance, TelosB runs at 8 MHz; OpenMote-CC2538
can run at a maximum speed of 32MHz. As a
result, the software-based implementation of link-
layer security in OpenMote-CC2538 will result in a
timeslot duration reduced by a factor of 2− 3×.
The hardware implementation strategy results in
a shorter slotframe than the software implementa-
tion. Depending on the security level, a hardware-
based implementation of link-layer security will
result in a timeslot duration reduced by 3− 4×.
The difference in timeslot duration between
“software” and “hybrid” implementation strategies
reflects the advantage of having AES execute
in hardware. Similarly, the comparison between
“hybrid” and “hardware” implementations reflects
the advantage of a hardware-based CCM*.
On slower platforms such as the TelosB (Fig. 5),
the biggest gains are made by running AES in
hardware.
The most common security level in TSCH
networks (including WirelessHART and 6TiSCH)
is ENC-MIC-32, i.e. frames are encrypted and a 4-
byte MIC is used for authentication. We highlight
that security level in Figs. 5 and 6. A full software
implementation on an older platform such as the
TelosB results in a minimal timeslot duration of
88 ms. Using hardware acceleration reduces the time
duration by a factor of 4, down to 25 ms. Switching
to a state-of-the-art platforms, which features both
faster hardware implementation of AES and CCM*,
and a single-chip architecture, allows the timeslot
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Figure 3. ROM and RAM Footprint of the implementations for TelosB mote.
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Figure 4. ROM and RAM Footprint of the implementations for OpenMote-CC2538 mote.
duration to be further reduce by a factor of more
than 2, down to 9 ms.
By using hardware accelerations in OpenMote-
CC2538, it is possible to satisfy the target value
of the timeslot duration reported by the standard,
i.e., 10 ms [8]. In the other cases, this goal is
not reached. Anyway, it is important to note that
conducted tests considered the worst case, where
the maximum size of the ASH is used (e.g. equal
to 14 bytes). Now, considering that the higher
the size of the ASH, the higher the computational
overhead introduced by additional (security) lookup
procedures,, all the results reported in Section 5 refer
to the most complex network configuration requiring
higher timeslot durations. Other configurations,
instead, may require lower timeslot durations.
5.4. Energy consumption
Figs. 7 and 8 reports the amount of energy consumed
by TelosB and OpenMote-CC2538, respectively,
for the three implementation strategies, and for
all eight security levels. These results have been
estimated (not experimentally measured) by taking
into account the energy consumption related to each
phase of the timeslot (TX, RX and CPU idle), as
reported by reference datasheets.
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TsTx
Offset 
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AckDelay
[ms]
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TsSlot
Duration 
[ms]
TsTx
Offset 
[ms]
TsTx
AckDelay
[ms]
minimal
TsSlot
Duration 
[ms]
TsTx
Offset 
[ms]
TsTx
AckDelay
[ms]
minimal
TsSlot
Duration 
[ms]
no security 3.63 4.46 12.24 3.63 4.46 12.24 3.63 4.46 12.24
MIC-32 15.71 35.61 56.15 9.90 27.59 40.62 7.75 11.87 25.21
MIC-64 16.32 35.89 57.86 10.11 27.96 41.69 7.81 12.18 25.97
MIC-128 16.72 36.5 59.09 10.42 28.66 42.91 7.90 12.79 27.50
ENC 9.93 20.01 34.38 8.60 11.56 25.96 7.66 10.01 22.92
ENC-MIC-32 26.48 44.22 88.02 14.92 33.24 53.22 7.78 12.48 25.36
ENC-MIC-64 28.25 44.52 91.98 14.98 33.61 54.05 7.83 12.54 26.28
ENC-MIC-128 30.53 45.04 94.49 15.29 34.15 55.51 7.97 12.94 27.65
Figure 5. Minimum timeslot duration for the TelosB mote.
Link-layer security brings to an increment of the
per-slot energy consumption because: (i) additional
operations are executed for protecting the transmit-
ted packet and decrypting the corresponding ACK
and (ii) the radio chip is in charge of transmitting
more data due to the ASH and the MIC.
On the TelosB mote, hardware accelerators
reduce energy consumption up to 27% (for
the hybrid implementation) and 47% (for the
hardware implementation). On the OpenMote-
CC2538, instead, hardware accelerators leads to a
gain of up to 58 % (for the hybrid implementation)
and 66% (for the hardware implementation).
Moreover, OpenMote-CC2538 always emerges as the
more energy-consuming platform.
5.5. Final considerations on high-level application
design
To conclude, based on the results described in the
previous Section, additional comments on high-level
application design and energy consumption can be
formulated.
As we have already anticipated in the Introduc-
tion, the shorter the timeslot, the higher the network
throughput. Therefore, the provisioning of link-layer
security inevitably brings to a throughput reduction.
In addition, the message overhead produced by
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Offset 
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AckDelay
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Duration
[ms]
TsTx
Offset 
[ms]
TsTx
AckDelay
[ms]
minimal
TsSlot
Duration
[ms]
TsTx
Offset 
[ms]
TsTx
AckDelay
[ms]
minimal
TsSlot
Duration
[ms]
no security 1.15 0.67 6.71 1.15 0.67 6.71 1.15 0.67 6.71
MIC-32 2.48 10.07 23.50 1.98 2.24 10.47 1.28 1.12 8.45
MIC-64 2.51 10.19 23.65 2.14 2.36 10.77 1.31 1.19 8.72
MIC-128 2.54 10.31 24.57 2.29 2.45 11.08 1.34 1.25 9.34
ENC 2.31 3.20 16.51 1.77 1.51 9.86 1.28 0.98 8.24
ENC-MIC-32 6.44 14.80 32.35 2.38 2.82 11.44 1.28 1.12 8.45
ENC-MIC-64 6.57 14.86 32.50 2.41 2.94 11.78 1.31 1.19 8.72
ENC-MIC-128 6.60 15.26 33.66 2.44 3.24 12.27 1.34 1.25 9.34
Figure 6. Minimum timeslot duration for the OpenMote-CC2538 mote.
each security level (i.e., Auxiliary Security Header
plus MIC, if present) differently impacts on the
effective amount of bytes that can be inserted, in
each packet, by the application layer. Practically, the
data generation rate, R, that a high-level application
running on the i-th device could use should satisfy
the following equation:
R ≤ Ni Aj
Nts TsSlotDuration
, (2)
where Ni, Aj , and Nts are the number of timeslots
assigned to the i-th device for transmitting data,
the maximum size of an application message due
to the j-th security level‖, and the total number
of timeslots available in a TSCH slot frame (i.e.,
a predefined number of timeslots that repeats over
the time). For simplicity, Eq. (2) has been obtained
by assuming the absence of packets fragmentation
at the application layer. Maximum performance
are reached if R = (Ni Aj)/(Nts TsSlotDuration)
and no packet losses are registered on the wireless
communication channel. Higher values of R are not
‖For instance, Ano security = 568 bits, AMIC−32 = 520 bits,
AMIC−64 = 488 bits, AMIC−128 424 = bits, AENC = 424 bits,
AENC−MIC−32 = 520 bits, AENC−MIC−64 = 488 bits, and
AENC−MIC−128 = 424 bits
11
 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
E
n
er
g
y
 c
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 [
m
J]
Software implementation
Hybrid implementation
Hardware implementation
Figure 7. Energy consumed in a single timeslot for the TelosB mote.
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Figure 8. Energy consumed in a single timeslot for the OpenMote-CC2538 mote.
supported because they produce an uncontrolled
increment of packet queue, thus bringing to a
growth of packet losses (e.g., packets are lost at the
transmitter side because there is not enough space
in the queue).
6. CONCLUSION
This works evaluates the overhead of using link-
layer security in IEEE802.15.4e Time Synchronized
Channel Hopping (TSCH) networks. The challenge
is that four link-layer security operations need to
happen in a single timeslot: securing/unsecuring the
data frame, and securing/unsecuring the acknowl-
edgment. The duration of the link-layer secur-
ing/unsecuring operations hence directly impacts on
the minimum duration of the timeslot. To increase
the overall throughput of the network, and decrease
the end-to-end latency, this duration should be as
low as possible.
We conduct a thorough experimental study,
and measure the overhead of link-layer security
across different generations of hardware, different
hardware/ software implementation strategies, and
different security levels in the IEEE 802.15.4
protocol. We use two popular off-the-shelf platforms,
separated by a decade of hardware development:
the older but still popular TelosB and the state-of-
the-art OpenMote-CC2538. All implementations are
done on the OpenWSN protocol stack, and available
open-source under a BSD license.
We show the benefits of hardware acceleration
for two “atomic” link-layer security mechanisms:
12
AES – a block cipher – and CCM* – a “wrapper”
cryptographic primitive around AES. Overall, using
hardware acceleration offers a 3− 4× reduction
in timeslot duration. Using the latest generation
hardware and full hardware acceleration allows a
timeslot duration reduction of roughly 10×, from
88 ms on older hardware using a fully software
implementation, down to 9 ms.
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